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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 26 SPRING 1951 Number 3
THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
ARCHIBALD Cox*
Although the National Labor Relations Act' is primarily concerned with
safeguarding employees in their right to organize labor unions and bargain
collectively, it also confers important rights to engage in strikes, picketing and
other forms of economic pressure. Section 7 created "the right . . . to en-
gage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." Section 8(a) (1) forbids an employer to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of a right guaran-
teed by section 7. When peaceful negotiations over wages or hours break
down and the employees resort to a peaceful strike, they are engaging in
"concerted activities." 2 The employer may hire replacements and refuse to
discharge them in order to make room for strikers who wish to return to their
jobs.3 But if the strikers' jobs have not been filled, to deny them reinstate-
ment4 or to impose other discipline5 is interference with the right to engage in
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935) as amended by 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
(Supp. 1949).
2. Some employee activities which are concerted activities as a matter of fact are
not "concerted activities" within the meaning of section 7. Throughout this article I
shall endeavor to use the phrases "concerted activity" and "concerted activities" as legal
concepts and to speak of "concert of action"e or "group activities" to describe facts.
3. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) ; NLRB v. Shenan-
doah-Dives Mining Co., 145 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1944). Where the strike is caused or
prolonged by an unfair labor practice, replacements hired after the violation must be
discharged to make room for the unfair labor practice strikers. NLRB v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 130 F.2d 919, 927-928 (2d Cir. 1942). Even though he has been replaced, a
striker remains an employee within section 2(3), hence discrimination against him be-
cause of union affiliation or activity like other unfair labor practices remains unlawful.
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., supra.
If all the strikers' positions have been filled prior to an unconditional application for
reinstatement but new vacancies occur thereafter, the employer may, under some cir-
cumstances, be held to have committed an unfair labor practice if he fails to employ
strikers for these positions. Container Mfg. Co., 75 N.LR.B. 1082 (1948).
4. Firth Carpet Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1942); Home Beneficial Life
Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1947).
The NLRB has generally stated that discrimination against strikers also violates
section 8(a) (3), but its reasoning is difficult to justify. Section 8(a) (3) declares it to
be an unfair labor practice "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation" by discrimination in hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of
employment. Discrimination against strikers may or may not encourage or discourage
membership in a labor organization. Such discrimination falls under section 8(a) (1)
because it interferes with concerted activities. It can be brought under section 8(a) (3)
only by asserting that the strikers constitute an informal labor organization ad hoc and
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concerted activities and violates section 8(a) (1). The same reasoning does
not apply if, for one reason or another, the-strike is not a concerted activity.
Such strikers are not exercising a right safeguarded by sections 7 and 8(a) (1)
and to punish them for their conduct is not an unfair labor practice. Thus an
employer's privilege to take reprisals against employees who resort to economic
measures depends to a considerable extent upon the meaning of "concerted
activities."
These well-established rules make interpretation of.the phrase "concerted
activities" an important problem in the administration 'of the Act. A union
might be reluctant to authorize a strike which, if lost, would subject the em-
ployees to reprisals because it was not a protected activity, even though the
same union would favor the strike if the only risk attendant upon its loss were
that some of the employees' jobs might be filled by strike-breakers.' Further-
more, a series of rulings placing objectionable activities outside the protection
of section 7 may exert effective moral influence if the decisions are soundly
conceived.
Under recent decisions there is a second, more important way in which
the interpretation of the phrase "concerted activities" will affect strikes and
picketing. Section 7 guarantees employees, in parallel terms, the rights-
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
and-
to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining and other mutual aid and protection.
Although the Wagner Act was originally aimed at the anti-union practices of
employers, the Supreme Court held in Hill v. Florida7 that state legislation
that discrimination against them discourages joining such informal organizations in the
future. NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950) ; The Sandy Hill Iron
& Brass Works, 55 N.L.R.B. 1 (1944). The NLRB has never explained the need for
resorting to this fiction. Apparently it stemmed from the assumption that since re-
instatement was an appropriate remedy for discharges in violation of section 8(a) (3)
proof of a section 8(a) (3) violation was prerequisite to an order of reinstatement.
NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950); cf. Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). It would seem sounder law to admit that the only unfair
labor practice is a violation of section 8(a) (1) and then to hold the remedy of reinstate-
ment is available under section 10(c) as appropriate way of effectuating the policies of
the Act. See e.g., NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1945). Gullett Gin Co. v.
NLRB, 179 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1950). Other NLRB decisions accept this analysis to the
extent of recognizing that it is immaterial whether the discharge be treated as a viola-
tion of section 8(a) (1) or 8(a) (3). Westinghouse Electric Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 1058,
1061 (1948) ; Rockingham Poultry Marketing Cooperative, Inc., 59 N.L.R.B. 486 (1944).
5. General Electric Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 174 (1948) (modification of seniority rights) ;
Potlach Forests, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 25 LAE. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1192 (1949)
(modification of seniority) ; Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 88 N.L.R.B. No. 191, 25 LA.
REL,. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1440 (1950) (demotion).
6. See e.g., Home Beneficial life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1947).
7. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
interfering with the right of employees "to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing" was inconsistent with the guarantees of
section 7 and therefore unconstitutional. In the Briggs-Strattons case the
unions argued that, by a parity of reasoning, the right "to engage in concerted
activities" is also a federal right which the states may not curtail. Since a
majority of the justices held that recurrent unannounced work stoppages were
not "concerted activities" within the meaning of section 7; there wag no need
to pass upon the major contention. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court
espoused the unions view.
Most state laws regulating strikes, boycotts- and picketing are based on
earlier common law doctrines and make concert of action an integral part of
the offenses which they create. Under the Briggs-Stratton approach such state
laws cannot be applied to employees subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB
when the employee's activities are "concerted activities" within the meaning
of section 7. Thus, while the Court has recently granted the states greater
freedom to regulate strikes and picketing in the absence of federal legislation,
it has concurrently extended the doctrine of federal preemption so as to bring
large parts of the law of strikes and picketing under federal control whenever
the employer and employees are subject to NLRA jurisdiction.?
Startling as this conclusion may seem the Court appeared to approve it
in United Automobile Workers, C.I.O. v. O'Brien. ° In holding the Michigan
strike control law constitutionally inapplicable to a peaceful strike for higher
wages because it was inconsistent with the NLRA, the Court said:
Congress has not been silent on the subject of strikes in interstate
commerce. In the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 . . .Con-
gress safeguarded the exercise of employees of 'concerted activities'
and expressly recognized the right to strike. It qualified and regu-
lated that right in the 1947 Act. . . None of these sections can
be read as permitting state regulation of peaceful strikes for higher
wages. Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation"
The same or parallel reasoning is applicable to any peaceful strike arising
out of a grievance or contract negotiations. With small modifications it could
be invoked in the case of strikes for other objectives. The implied conclusion
that Congress has removed all concerted activities from control by the states
is confirmed by the closing paragraph of the opinion, in which Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson answered the contention of the state authorities that their action
was sustained by the Briggs-Stratton case. "Clearly, we reaffirmed the prin-
ciple that if 'Congress has protected the union conduct which the state has
8. International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin E. R. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
9. Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Employer and Union
Conduct, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 191, 193-197 (1950).
10. 339 U.S. 454 (1950).'
11. Id. at 457.
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forbidden . . . the State legislation must yield.' That principle is controlling
here."' 2 Other passages in the O'Brien opinion make the decision susceptible
of a narrower interpretation if the Court decides to draw back from the posi-
tion towards which its decisions tend; but for the present we are bound to
conclude that the definition of "concerted activities" will measure not only
the extent of an employer's power to impose discipline but also the authority
of the stAtes to regulate strikes, boycotts and picketing.13
The purpose of this article is to discuss the meaning of the phrase "con-
certed activities" with emphasis upon (I) the criteria by which the definition
should be elaborated and (II) the allocation of responsibility for its interpreta-
tion between the NLRB and the courts.
I
The Wagner Act became law on the floodtide of the belief that the con-
flicting interests of management and worker can be adjusted only by private
negotiation, backed, if necessary, by economic weapons, without the interven-
tion of law. Earlier the Norris-LaGuardia Act' 4 had immunized in the federal
courts, all peaceful labor activities. "So long as a union acts in its self-interest
and does not combine with non-labor groups the licit and the illicit . . . are
not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of
which the particular union activities are the means."'15 Later the Supreme
Court seemed to be about to write at least some of this philosophy into con-
stitutional law.' 6 There even developed considerable tolerance for violence
and other activities unhesitatingly punished in the absence of a law dispute.
"A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in
it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the depihs. Rising passions
call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The trans-
formation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest
is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this
nature, however much it is to be reiretted, must have been in the contemplation
of Congress when it provided in Section 13 of the [Wagner] Act that nothing
therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to em-
ployees by the Act would be indeed illusory.'"
12. Id. at 459.
13. The conclusions summarized above are discussed at length in Cox and Seidman,
Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV..L. RFv. 211 (1950). The decision in Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin E. R. Bd., 71 Sup. Ct. 359 (1951),
confirms the conclusion stated above.
14. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1946).
15. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1940).
16. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
17. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939).
CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
The philosophy behind the labor legislation of the nineteen thirties was
deeply rooted in the disappointing experience of half a century of legal
intervention into industrial conflicts. In a democracy sanctions can be invoked
only against the occasional wrongdoer. The effectiveness of law depends
upon its acceptance by the governed, either because they approve the policy
which it expresses or because it is the law. To enforce a judicial edict against
large numbers of employees is out of the question. There was, and is, no
consensus of opinion about the propriety of labor's various objectives or of
the weapons with which they are pursued. In each instance the decision,
whether statutory or judge-made, too obviously involves policy .judgments,
and feelings run too high, for it to command acquiescence merely because it is
law. Hence Congress turned the policy of relying for the adjustment of in-
dustrial conflicts upon negotiation between employers and labor organizations
strong enough to bargain effectively on behalf of employees. Judicial inter-
vention into strikes, boycotts or pickdting was prohibited partly because it did
nothing to resolve the underlying problems and partly because the injunction
was traditionally a weapon for weakening employee organization,
The Wagner Act's guaranty of a right to engage in concerted activities is
rooted in this philosophy. "In the light of labor movement history, the purpose
of the quoted provision of the statute becomes clear. The most effective legal
weapon against the struggling labor union was the doctrine that' concerted
activities were conspiracies, and for that reason illegal. Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act took this conspiracy weapon away from the
employer in employment relations which affect interstate commerce. No
longer can any State, as to relations within the reach of the Act, treat other-
wise lawful activities to aid unionization as an illegal conspiracy merely be-
cause they are undertaken by many persons acting in concert.", Under the
words of section 7 concerted employee activities in pursuit of "other mutual
aid or protection" must receive an equal degree of statutory protection.
The phrase "concerted activities" was interpreted most broadly during
the early administration of the Wagner Act. It was not necessary to show
that the employees were a majority19 or that they were acting in behalf of a
labor union. 2 Their objective was treated as irrelevant; and although the
NLRB always recognized that particular activities might be so indefensible
18. International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin E. R. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
19. Firth Carpet Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Agar Packing & Provi-
sion Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1949) ; Olin Industries, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 203 (1949). As
to concerted action by a minority after the designation of a bargaining representative,
see pp. 331-333 infra.
20. See NLRB v. Tovrea Packing Co., 111 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1940); NLRB v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948) ; NLRB v. Kennametal, Inc.,
182 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Morristown Knitting Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 731 (1948).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
as to warrant discharge,2 it not infrequently held employers guilty of unfair
labor practices for punishing violations of normal plant discipline and breaches
of the peace.22 Indeed, it is not too much to say that the starting point in the
interpretation of the right to engage in "concerted activities" was the proposi-
tion that the quoted phrase is a factual description, not a legal concept, and
therefore covers all 'activities which are in fact concerted.
In this naked form the proposition could not be defended against some
exceptions. When the Supreme Court held that the NLRB lacked power to
order the reinstatement of sit-down strikers as a remedy for the unfair labor
practices which precipitated the strike,2 3 it followed a fortiori that a sit-down
strike was not protected under section 7. The same was true of strikes on
board ship 24 and strikes in breach of contr'act. 2' Later the NLRB was driven
to recognize that in determining whether a peaceful strike fell within section 7,
21. Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686 (1938) ; Armour and Co., 25 N.L.R.B.
989, 996 (1940).
22. E.g., Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 714, viodified, 147 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.
1945) ; Wytheville Knitting Mills, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 640, set aside, 175 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1949).
23. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
24. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1940).
A sharp distinction should be drawn between the Fansteel and Southern S.S. type of
case and the problem of defining the concerted activities protected by section 7. Where
a strike results from an employer's refusal to bargain collectively or from other unfair
labor practices, as in the Fansteel case, the NLRB and courts may be faced with the
problem of determining what effect the misconduct of the unfair labor practice strikers
should have upon the normal remedy of reinstatement. This question turns upon the
extent of the authority conferred on the NLRB by section 10(c), which empowers the
NLRB to require employers who have engaged in unfair labor practices to take "such
affirmative action, including reinstatement with back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this Act." In the cases discussed in this article the critical question is whether there
has been an unfair labor practice. Such a practice is made out if the employees' conduct
constituted "concerted activities." There is no unfair labor practice if the employer
discharges the employees or imposes other discipline for conduct which falls outside
the scope of "concerted activities."
Not only are the two groups of cases analytically distinguishable, the practical results
may also differ. Employee misconduct may not be sufficiently serious to bar reinstate-
ment under section 10(c) when the provocation of the employers' unfair labor practices
is taken into account. But the same misconduct may fall outside the scope of the con-
certed activities protected by sections 7 and 8(a) (1) and therefore furnish the basis for an
effective discharge if there has been no antecedent unfair labor practice. Compare NLRB
v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940),
and Berkshire Knitting Mills, 46 N.L.R.B. 955 (1943), with Republic Creosoting Co., 19
N.L.R.B. 267 (1940) and International Nickel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 286 (1948). The dis-
tinction was overlooked by the House managers in reporting the conference agreement
on the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
38-39 (1947) and unfortunately it has not always been observed by the Board. In
National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948) three members joined in deny-
ing reinstatement as a remedy for an unfair labor practice which provoked a strike in
breach of contract. Possibly the result is a sound exercise of administrative discretion
in framing a remedy which will effectuate the policy of the Act, but the opinion errs
in basing the conclusion on the ground that the strike in breach of contract was not an
activity protected by section 7. See Chairman Herzog's concurring opinion at pp. 1001-1002.
25. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939).
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the objective of the strike might be decisive. Thus strikes to compel the com-
mission of an unfair labor practice26 or to secure an unlawful wage increase 7
were denied NLRA protection. Just as subsequent experience led to the
widespread belief that the philosophy of the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts, despite their essential soundness, required some limitation, so did adjudi-
cation under section 7 demonstrate that it could not wisely be held to immunize
all group activity, however conducted and without regard to its aim. The im-
portant point to be observed, however, is that the basic philosophy has not been
changed. Even though "concerted activities" has become a legal concept, the
process of interpretation still begins at the original starting point; exceptions
exist, or are created, only when the employees' conduct plainly deserves
condemnation.
But although the philosophy of section 7 fixes the bias from which the
definition of "concerted activities" should be approached, it does not furnish
criteria by which to draw the line between protected and unprotected activities.
Thus the central problem becomes the establishment of standards by which
wholly egregious factors can be eliminated and the subjective attitudes of
judges and administrators reduced to minimal roles.
A. Standards furnished by NLRA
Express Provisions.-Although section 8(b) regulates only the conduct
of labor organizations and section 7 deals with the rights of employees, it
seems plain that the group activities which section 8(b) forbids a labor
organization to lead must fall outside the protection of section 7 when em-
ployees engage in them either with or without the direction of a union. To
hold otherwise would disregard legislative history2" and create an unwarranted
anomaly. In the absence of union sponsorship there may be no need for
government intervention to curtail undesirable employee activities, but surely
the activities themselves have no greater claim to affirmative protection.
The converse conclusion is not necessarily true. It has often been said that
there is an area of employee activity, not precisely defined, which, while not
constituting an unfair labor practice under section 8(b), is nevertheless not
protected by section 7.29 The doctrine evolved out of a series of cases decided
under the Vagner Act, which may be illustrated by Thompson Products, Inc.3"
On September 14, 1942, the Society of Tool and Die Craftsmen was certified
as the exclusive representative of the respondent's employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit. Later United Automobile Workers, C.I.O., instituted a strike
26. Thompson Products, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 13, vacated, 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947).
27. American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
28. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-40 (1947).
29. Perry Norvell Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 225, 241 (1948); National Maritime Union, 78
N.L.R.B. 971, 986-987 (1948).
30. Thompson Products, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 13, vacated, 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947).
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for the purpose of compelling the respondent to grant UAW exclusive recogni-
tion in disregard of the certification. The Company offered to reinstate the
strikers without discrimination but subsequently discharged the leaders. After
some vacillation the Board held that the discharge of the committeemen was
not a violation of section 8 (1) "because they had called and continued a strike
whose purpose was unlawful. . . . There would be neither moral, legal nor
practical justification for our requiring employers to respect our certifications
if we were unwilling to respect them ourselves."'"
Although the point seems obvious, there was strong resistance to its
acceptance. Dr. Millis, as NLRB chairman, and later Mr. Houston, stoutly
maintained the view that "Congress used the phrase 'concerted activity' in our
Act, as in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, with the deliberate aim of excluding
any inquiry by the Board or the Courts into the purpose for which employees
strike. . . ." Their fear was that the doctrine of the majority would be
extended "to embrace a wide variety of employee conduct, the purpose of
which is deemed to be in violation of some Federal law or other expression of
public policy contained in State or local laws or court decisions," thus re-
introducing "a convenient device whereby a judge might outlaw union conduct
which was contrary to his own economic or social philosophy. 32
Interpretation of section 7 would present the dangers feared by Dr. Millis
if the acceptance of an objectives test were coupled with willingness to grant
or deny the protection of section 7 according to -the judge's own view of the
justifiability of each objective. The rationale of the Thompson Products
decision, however, permits the judge to rely on extrinsic standards and there-
fore allows him to observe any one or more of three limitations on the use of
the objectives test which were not recognized in common law cases. First, in
the Thompson Products case the objective was "unlawful" not merely in the
somewhat Pickwickian sense in which the term is used in labor law, but also
because the union could not attain its objective by any method without bringing
about a violation of a positive statutory command. Second, there was a legis-
lative standard for the Board to follow. Third, the standard was contained in
the very same statute which was alleged to protect' the employees' activities.
Logic would permit drawing the limits of the Thompson Products doctrine at
any of these points, if policy required.
Now that the NLRA proscribes union unfair labor practices, there are
few occasions for invoking the doctrine that a strike to compel the commission
of an employer unfair labor practice is not a "concerted activity" within the
31. Id. at 888-889.
32. American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1314, 1318 (1944). Cf. Thompson
Products, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 13, 23, 24 (1947). Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act the
federal courts may not enjoin a strike for the purpose of compelling an employer to com-
mit an unfair labor practice. United States v. Building & Construction Trades Council,
313 U.S. 539 (1941).
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meaning of section 7. The most troublesome cases have developed out of
strikes for exclusive recognition and bargaining rights called at a time when
two unions were competing for designation as the employees' representative.
Section 8(b) (4) does not expressly condemn such activities, and the NLRB
has held that they are not impliedly proscribed by section 8(b) (1).83 It is
an unfair labor practice, however, for an employer to grant exclusive recogni-
tion to either of the competing unions after a petition has been filed requesting
the NLRB to investigate and certify the representative.3 4 Hence it has been
argued that employees who strike during a representation proceeding for the
purpose of enforcing their claim to recognition are attempting to procure the
commission of an unfair labor practice and, under the Thompson Products
decision, should be denied the protection of section 7. After avoiding a
square decision for some time,35 the Board recently held that such activities
are protected.
Under the doctrine of the Midwest Piping case the employer's ex-
clusive recognition of one of the two rival unions violates the Act
only if at the time such recognition is granted the question of
representation is still pending. However, before recognition is
granted many things might occur which would remove that question
and would render exclusive recognition of a majority representative
perfectly lawful: Thus, for example, the rival union might withdraw
its petition, or the Board, for any number of reasons, might dismiss
it. Again, the employer faced with rival demands may . . . grant
recognition to each of the rival claimants on a member's only basis.
: , . The chances of violation [as a result of recognizing the
striking union] may be greater in -some cases, less in others, but in
all cases there are substantial uncertainties inherent in the situa-
tion. In such circumstances we see no justification for extending
the American News and Thompson Products principles.,
It is easy to conjure up contingencies under which almost any demand
may cease to be unlawful; in the Thompson Products case the certification
might have been revoked, the majority union might have disintegrated, the
striking union might have compromised for a lawful concession. The quoted
decision is justified, however, by the impracticability of attempting to ad-
minister a distinction between strikes to compel premature recognition and
other organizational strikes and picketing. Since the Midwest Piping doctrine
does not apply until a petition for investigation and certification has been
filed, a strike for recognition in the face of a competing claim to recognition
33. Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948).
34. Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); Flotill Products,
Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 119 (1946). The rule.is known as the Midwest Piping doctrine. It
has been questioned in at least two circuits. NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 180,
F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950) ; NLRB v. Flotill Products, Inc., 180 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1950).
35. Columbia Pictures Corp., 64 N.L.R.B. 490 (1945); National Silver Co., 71
N.L.R.B. 594 (1946); Horton's Laundry, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 1129 (1947).
36. Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 201, 26 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1365 (1950).
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would not be a strike to compel the commission of an unfair labor practice;
hence that activity would be protected. Should the strikers lose protection the
moment one party files a petition under section 9 in order to resolve the
controversy? A strike to bring pressure on the employees to join a union is
protected even though the union also voices the demand that the employer
recognize it upon its designation by the majority of the employees in the
manner prescribed by the NLRA.3 7 A strike demanding a prompt election
and recognition following certification would also be lawful. To deprive the
strikers of protection because their banners demand immediate rather than
eventual recognition would put too high a premium on verbal niceties. Peace-
ful organizational strikes prior to NLRB action should be classified in a single
group. Since most of them are concerted activities, all should be protected.
NLRA policy.-In a number of cases the discharge of strikers has been
sustained, even though their positions were vacant, on the ground that their
activities were inconsistent with the basic policies of the NLRA. To the
extent that these policies are implicit in the statute and fairly well-defined,
they furnish a second source of objective standards for defining the scope
of "concerted activities." But where the policy is only a loose generalization
or there is doubt as to what the policy of the Act may be, this approach
leaves much to the interpreter of the statute.
The clearest cases are those resulting from strikes in breach of a collective
bargaining agreement. 3 A tendency to carry over into a law of collective
bargaining the accepted view that a breach of contract is a civil wrong may have
influenced the courts in concluding that the phrase "concerted activities" could
not have been intended to protect employees engaged in contract violations.
But certainly not every civil wrong falls outside section 7, and the principal
ground for the rulings would seem to be that the purpose of the statute
is to compel employers to bargain collectively with their employees to the
end that employment contracts binding on both parties should be executed.
"The stability of labor relations that the statute seeks to accomplish by the
encouragement of the collective bargaining process ultimately depends up-
on the channelization of the collective bargaining relationship within the
framework of the collective agreement, and the adherence thereto by both
37. Cf. Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27
Cal.2d 599, 165 P.2d 891 (1946) ; Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P2d
870 (1946).
38. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
NLRB, 127 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1942); Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1946);
Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947). The recent enthusiasm of the
NLRB for this rule is illustrated by the questionable decision in National Electric
Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948), discussed in note 24 supra.
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employers and employees."3 9  It would tend to make the statute self-
defeating to interpret "concerted activities" broadly enough to protect viola-
tions of the very agreements whose negotiation it seeks to induce.
One of the troublesome problems in applying the foregoing principle is
to determine the extent to which a collective agreement contains an under-
taking not to resort to economic pressures. In Dorsey Trailers, I1C., 40 for
example, a dispute arose over the discharge of an employee for an alleged
breach of plant discipline. The current collective bargaining agreement
contained no specific limitation on the right of employees to strike, but
it did establish a four-step procedure for the settlement of grievances ter-
minating in arbitration. The employees struck instead of invoking the
grievance procedure. Later they offered to return to work, but the em-
ployer imposed a two-week disciplinary layoff. At the union's request the
lay-off was reduced to four days. The NLRB held the employer guilty
of an unfair labor practice on the ground that the strike, not being in
breach of contract, was protected by section 7. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed, partly 6n the ground that there was an implied
undertaking not to strike until the grievance procedure had been exhausted
and partly on the ground that the agreement between company and union
for a four day disciplinary lay-off should not be overturned.
The issue in the Dorsey case is obviously close. A collective bargaining
agreement carries a number of implied commitments. An agreement fixing
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for a definite
period implicitly binds both parties not to take economic action to compel
a change before the agreement expires.41 Where a grievance procedure is
established, one might, by parallel reasoning, imply the additional under-
taking by each party not to resort to economic pressure until the procedure
has been exhausted. If it were clear that such implied undertakings not
to strike could be made effective, the Court of Appeals' decision would be
sound. The difficulty is that although plant discipline and legal sanctions
may greatly influence the attitude of workers towards their contract com-
mitments by giving them increased moral force, nevertheless the effective-
39. United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B: 768, 773 (1949). The decision also holds that
it is not an unfair labor practice to solicit individual strikers to return to work or to offer
a unilateral wage increase where the strike is in breach of contract. This portion of the
decision has been sharply questioned. Cox and Dunlop, The Dity To Bargain Collectively
During the Term of a Collective Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1097, 1106-1107, esp.
n.30 (1950).
40. 80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948), enforcement denied, 179 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1950).
41. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' & Long-
shoremen's Benevolent Society, 265 Fed. 397 (1920); Harper v. Local Union No. 520,
IBEW, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). See also letter to the Editor of the
New York Times from Mr. Jesse Freidin, former General Counsel of the War Labor
Board, reprinted in part in 20 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 215 (1947).
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ness of a labor contract ultimately depends upon its ability to command
voluntary acceptance.4" A "no strike" clause is the subject of considerable
deliberation during contract negotiations and is often a concession for which
the union exacts a substantial price from the employer.4 3  The Board might
well have felt that, in the absence of an express reservation, workers would
neither understand nor accept the doctrine that there was no right to en-
gage in concerted action prior to exhaustion of the grievance procedure.
The Dorsey Trailers case also illustrates a second NILRB doctrine which
is important in administering the statutory guaranty of a right to engage in
concerted activities. After the events related, a new contract was signed; it
contained a promise that there should be no strikes pending the exhaustion
of the grievance procedure. Nevertheless the men struck again, this time
over a question of contract interpretation. A week later they offered un-
conditionally to return to work. The employer replied that as a result of
the strike it had canceled its orders for materials and would have no work
available for an indefinite period. The plant reopened a month and a half
later. All the strikers were rehired except three union officers who had
been leaders in the strike. The Board held that the refusal to reinstate
these men "because of their leadership in the strike" was an unfair labor
practice. The Fifth Circuit reversed the resulting order of reinstatement.
The theory underlying the NLRB decision has never been thoroughly
explicated. In the Dorsey Trailers case the Board declared:
Respondent by its own action had condoned the complainants' breach
of their contractual obligations and waived the right to discharge or re-
fuse to reinstate such persons because of the character of the strike.4"
But this statement, which repeats a doctrine announced in earlier cases, merely
states the conclusion. What is the basis for a doctrine of waiver or condona-
tion? If the employer's motives were to discourage taking an active part in
legitimate union activities, there would be an unfair labor practice; the strikers
remain employees, at least until they are discharged, even though they are not
engaged in concerted activities protected by section 7. The condonation doc-
trine appears to have evolved out of decisions based upon this principle. 4 5
42. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaininq and.the Concept of Contract, 48 CoL. L. Rxv.
829 (1948).
43. In the Dorsey Trailers case, for example, the union secured a union security clause
in return for putting a no-strike clause into the next agreement.
44. 80 N.L.R.B. 478, 484 (1948).
45. The case most often cited in NLRB opinions, Stewart Die Casting Corp. v.
NLRB, 114 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1940), plainly rests on the principles stated above. After
a sit-down strike the respondent had refused to reinstate some of the strikers although
no employee was discharged for participation in the sit-down. The Board found that the
men denied reinstatement had been discriminated against "because they joined and assisted
the U.A.W. and engaged in concerted activity in connection therewith." 15 N.L.R.B.
872, 900. The respondent argued that an order of reinstatement was proper because
the men had lost their status as employees by engaging in a sit-down strike. The court
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There is, however, a decisive difference between (a) discharging the leaders
of a strike in breach of contract because of their leadership in collective
activities generally and (b) disciplining them more severely than other em-
ployees (or singling them out for discipline) because they led the workers
in the unlawful activities. The latter practice has often been approved by
experienced labor arbitrators in awards sustaining the imposition of heavier
penalties upon the union officers and other leaders of wildcat strikes than
upon the rank and file.46 The lack of an adequate explanation for the
doctrine gives rise to faint suspicion that the Board is seeking to protect
the strikers in every possible case even though precedent and policy make
it plain that their action is not a concerted activity within the meaning of
section 7. Unless further justification is developed, the doctrine is likely
to be received in other courts as coolly as in the Fifth Circuit.
Strikes in breach of contract are not the only instances in which the
policies of the statute furnish objective standards for the interpretation of
concerted activities. In NLRB v. Draper Corp.47 41 out of 160 employees in
the bargaining unit engaged in a brief stoppage protesting what they believed
was the company's deliberate stalling during the negotiation of its first con-
tract with the certified representative. The union did not call, authorize or
sanction the strike. The Fourth Circuit, reversing the NLRB, held that the
employees were not engaged in concerted activities within the protection of
section 7 because theirs was "a strike in violation of the purposes of the Act
by a minority group of employees in an effort to interfere with collective
bargaining by the duly authorized agent selected by all the employees.
• . .minorities who engage in 'wild cat' strikes, in violation of rights estab-
lished by the collective bargaining statute, can find nothing in that statute
which protects them from discharge." '
If the Draper decision rests upon a ruling that "concerted activities" does
held that they did not lose their status as employees because the respondent plainly had not
terminated anyone's status as employee because of the sit-down. Therefore, the court
said, the workers continued to be protected against discrimination based upon union
membership and activities other than the sit-down. NLRB v. Aladdin Industries, Inc.,
125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1942) was a similar case, for the decision rested upon the Board's
finding that the employees were denied reinstatement "because they had applied for
employment through the union and thus indicated a partisan adherence to said union."
125 F.2d at 384. The Carey Salt Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1099 (1946), involved a similar set of
facts. Cf. Thompson Products, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 13, vacated and set aside, 72 N.L.R.B.
886 (1947). Apparently the Board failed to observe the distinction when in Fafnir Bear-
ing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1947), it first applied the doctrine of condonation to em-
ployees who were denied reinstatement, despite the return of most of the strikers to
their former positions, on the ground that they had been the leaders in the unprotected
activities. The Fafnir ruling has been followed in subsequent cases. See e.g., Columbia
Pictures Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 568 (1949).
46. E.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., 2 LAB. AR. REP. 194 (1945). Nathan Mfg. ,Co., 7
LAB. ARn. REP. 3 (1947).
47. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).,
48. Id. at 205.
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not include conduct the purpose of which is to interfere with collective bar-
gaining by the majority representative, 9 it is sound enough in principle even
though the application of the principle to the facts may be questioned.
Majority rule requires the minority to bow to the decision of the majority
and submerge its interests in those of the group. Hence, to hold that section 7
does not protect concerted action, the purpose of which is either to induce
the employer to disregard its contract with the certified union 0 or to press
upon the employer demands inconsistent with the certified union's bargain-
ing policies,21 is merely to apply a principle of interpretation already discussed:
Section 7 cannot be supposed to protect activities inconsistent with one of
the fundamental purposes of the Act, whether it be the negotiation of bind-
.ing contracts or the determination of terms and conditions of employment
through a system of collective bargaining based upon majority rule.
It is doubtful, however, whether this interpretation is adequate to support
the ruling in the Draper case. There-was nothing to show that the stoppage
interfered with the certified union's conduct of the negotiations or, indeed,
that the union disapproved the strikers' action. The absence of such evidence
may explain the sentences in the opinion which appear to lay down the rule that
when there is a bargaining representative, concerted action by a minority, not
authorized by the representative, is not protected by section 7. If so, the
employer may discipline the strikers and unless Congress has preempted the
field, their action may be enjoined or punished by the state.12
It is easy to agree with the court's conviction that the wildcat strike is a
harmful and demoralizing form of industrial strife. Even where its purpose
is not to thwart the desire of the majority expressed through their designated
representative, it may disrupt plant relationships and interfere with the normal
processes of collective bargaining. But the considerations are not all on one
side. Much can be said in favor of aggressive unions whose leaders are
constantly pricked to action by militant minorities. It may be sound policy
not to submerge the interests of minority groups into the policies or inertia
of the union hierarchy until the collective agreement is negotiated-or at
least until the union has formally adopted a position. The choice between
the conflicting considerations requires a policy judgment as to how the
institution of collective bargaining should operate. To make that kind
of judgment the basis for an interpretation of section 7 casts the court
or administrative agency adrift from the statute, for no provision of the
49. This is the interpretation put upon the case by the NLRB. See Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 88 N.L.R.B. No. 191, 25 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1440 (1950). Compare Nu-Car
Carriers, 88 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 25 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1288 (1950).
50. Markham & Callow v. International Woodworkers of America, 170 Ore. 517, 135
P.2d 727 (1943).
51. See p. 328 supra.
52. Cox and Seidman, op. cit. supra note 13.
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Act supplies a standard by which the choice can be made. Most courts
have followed the Board in granting minority strikers the protection of
section 7 unless their conduct was improper for another reason.5
3
B. Standards drawn from other federal legislation
Although the course of decisions has not been uniform, it seems plain that
other relevant federal legislation may serve as a guide in delimiting "concerted
activities" in cases in which the answer is not furnished by the NLRA. In
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB54 the Supreme Court held that the Board had-
abused its discretion in ordering a shipowner to reinstate employees who, pro-
voked by unfair labor practices, had struck in violation of the mutiny statute.
Since the ruling necessarily implies that the strikers were not engaged in
protected activities, the case may illustrate the proposition that economic
pressure which violates another federal law is not protected under section
7. In American News Co." a majority of the Board took the additional step
of holding that an employer might lawfully discipline employees who had
ceased work for the purpose of enforcing their demand for a wage increase
that would violate the Wage Stabilization Act. The case seemed neces-
sarily to decide that the NLRB would take into account other federal
legislatiqn in determining what activities are protected by section 7. The
American News case was subsequently followed by the Seventh Circuit.5 6
Despite these decisions the Board and at least one circuit court of appeals
refused to apply the American News doctrine to employees who went on strike
without giving the 30 days' notice and W* aiting for the vote required by the War
Labor Disputes Act.5 7 Although the general dissatisfaction with the War La-
bor Disputes Act makes it unlikely that the same problem will arise again, the
cases involved two points of principle which are sufficiently important to
require discussion.
53. See authorities cited note 19 supra. The contrary dictum in NLRB v. Indiana Desk
Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945), apparently rests upon a misunderstanding of NLRB v.
Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 119 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1941), where the court said that "a
minority is in no position to strike because of failure to bargain -with it and then receive
compulsory reinstatement." The facts of the Bra-shear case are not very clearly stated
in the opinion but the NLRB decision (13 N.L.R.B. 191) makes it plain that the NLRB
had ordered reinstatement of six strikers, discharging their replacements if necessary, on
the theory that the strike was caused by an unfair refusal to bargain. When the latter
finding was reversed, the order necessarily fell with it; the strikers, being "economic
strikers," were not entitled to reinstatement at the expense of replacements and, since the
NLRB had not ruled upon the issue, there was no occasion for the court to decide whether
refusal to reinstate them to vacant positions would be an unfair labor practice.
54. 316 U.S. 31 (1940).
55. 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944) ; cf. Rockwood Stove Works, 63 N.L.R.B. 1297 (1945).
56. NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945).
57. Republic Steel Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1945); Bohn Aluminum and Brass
Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 847, 850 (1946) ; Agar Packing & Provision Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 1262
(1949); Hamilton v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1947).
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First. The opinions seek to justify the failure to follow the American
News doctrine on the ground that the legislative history showed that the War
Labor Disputes Act was not intended to curtail the protection accorded em-
ployees under the NLRA. What the legislative history actually showed was
only that Congress did not intend to deprive employees who struck in violation
of the War Labor Disputes Act of their status as employees under the Wagner
Act. In relying upon this history the court overlooked the distinction between
(1) depriving employees of their rights under the NLRA and (2) holding
that concerted violations of congressional labor policy are protected by section
7. The former step opens the door to discrimination against union leaders, to
other forms of interference, coercion and restraint, and to refusals to bargain
collectively while the workers are on strike. The latter ruling would withhold
NLRB assistance only against discharges or other discipline based specifically
upon the employees' violation of the related statute. The obscuring of the
distinction often cuts against the interests of the workers. It has led the
Board into holding that a strike in breach of contract terminates the worker's
status as employees and therefore opens the way to practices which, under
other circumstances, would violate the duty to bargain collectively. 8 Upon
the same reasoning the Board also holds that such a strike cuts the workers
off from any consideration of the wisdom of affording them the normal
remedies for unfair labor practices. Thus far, however, the decisions are
not so numerous as to bar their reconsideration upon a sounder analysis.5 9
Second. Although the opinions place the ruling on the ground that the
legislative history showed that the War Labor Disputes Act was not intended
to affect rights under the NLRA, one senses that the decisions stemmed at
least in part from administrative and judicial disapproval of the provisions in
the War Labor Disputes Act calling for notice of intent to strike, a waiting
period and a strike vote conducted by the NLRB. Such disapproval was fully
warranted-indeed the Congress came to share it-but there is no ground on
which the NLRB can properly use some related federal laws as standards in
interpreting the phrase "concerted activities" and refuse to use others. The
principle of the American News case seems sound and should be uniformly
followed.
C. The effect of state law
Under the current Supreme Court decisions the right of employees "to
engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining and
other mutual aid and protection" is a federal right which cannot be curtailed
58. United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949).
59. National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948)..
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by state legislation ° or action of an administrative body.6' On principle,
interference by a state court would be equally invalid even though based upon
common law principles. It follows that neither state statutes nor common law
decisions defining the permissible employee activities can furnish, by them-
selves, standards, sufficient for determining the scope of the protection
accorded to employees by section 7.62
Probably the rule would be the same even if the Supreme Court were to
draw back from the conclusion that the NLRA guarantees employees a right to
engage in concerted activities immune from state intervention as well as em-
ployer interference. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.6 3 the Supreme Court
held that the term "employees" must be given a single, uniform interpretation.
Both the terms and the purposes of the statute, as well as the legisla-
tive history, show that Congress had in mind no such patchwork plan
for securing freedom of employees' organization and collective bar-
gaining. . .. The Wagner Act is federal legislation, administered
by a national agency, intended to solve a national problem on a
national scale. Cf. e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-4. It is an Act, therefore, in reference to which it is not only
proper, but necessary for us to assume, 'in the absence of a plain
indication to the contrary, that Congress . . is not making
the application of the federal Act dependent on State law.'
The same reasoning would seem applicable to the term "concerted activities."
By these observations I do not mean to imply that state law is always irrele-
vant. As pointed out below, section 7 probably leaves room for state legislation
curtailing concert of action aimed at achieving violations of other state laws.
D. Standards drawn from other sources
The problem of defining "concerted activities" does not end with the
exclusion of conduct inconsistent with the express provisions or policy of the
NLRA, or of some related federal statute. The NLRB has repeatedly stated
that the phrase does not comprehend conduct which is -"so indefensible, under
the circumstances" as to warrant discharge. 4 The courts of appeals also have
denied the protection of sections 7 and 8(a) (1) to workers whose group activi-
ties were regarded as improper either because of their objective or because of
the way in which the objective was pursued. Despite the number and uniform-
ity of these decisions however, they offer no very satisfactory rationalization.
The problem was presented to the Supreme Court in International Union,
UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin E.R. Bd.65 The union had engaged'in a series of
60. United Automobile Workers, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
61. International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin E. R. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
62. Hamilton v. NLRB, 160 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1947); cf. NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mig. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595.
63. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
64. See cases cited note 21 supra.
65. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
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short unannounced work stoppages for the purpose of weakening the employer
in anticipation of the bargaining about to take place over a new collective
-agreement. Under Wisconsin law the activities were unlawful, hence they
were enjoined by the local ourts. The Supreme Court upheld Wisconsin's
action on the ground that the employees were not engaged -in "concerted ac-
tivities" within the meaning of section 7. Mr. Justice Jackson, who delivered
the opinion of the Court, gave no reason for this conclusion except to say-
In the light of labor movement history, the purpose of the quoted
provision of the statute becomes clear. The most effective legal
weapon against the struggling labor union was the doctrine that con-
certed activities were conspiracies, and for that reason illegal. Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act took this conspiracy weapon
away from the employer in employment relations which affect
interstate commerce. No longer can any state, as to relations
within reach of the Act, treat otherwise lawful activities to aid
unionization as an illegal conspiracy merely because they are
undertaken by many persons acting in concert. 6
The courts which espoused the prima facie theory of torts articulated by
Holmes and Wigmore held that a combination to inflict injury on an employer's
business might be justified by the objective of the combination if it were
pursued in a lawful manner; it was on what methods were lawful and what
objectives constituted justification that judges disagreed. Those courts which
spoke in the language of the law of conspiracy generally held that the lawful-
ness or unlawfulness of a conspiracy depended upon its purpose and on the
means which the combination invoked. There were many demands which
were treated as unlawful objectives of concerted action even though they might
lawfully be achieved through different means. Collective bargaining,17 the
closed or union shop," and agreements to postpone the installation of labor
saving machinery" were often treated as unlawful objectives in this sense
of the word. In the passage just quoted from his Briggs-Stratton opinion
Mr. Justice Jackson explains that section 7's guaranty of the right to engage
in concerted activities overruled this doctrine. The interpretation seems
sound and has real value in determining how far a state may go in limiting
the objectives for which employees may strike,70 but it offers little help
66. Id. at 257-258.
67. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 237 Mass. 537, 130 N.E. 86 (1921).
68. "A strike for a closed shop has, accordingly, been held a strike for an unlawful
purpose. . . . On the other hand, agreements voluntarily made between an employer and
a union calling for a closed shop have always been recognized and enforced in this
Commonwealth." Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 388, 48 N.E.2d 1, 3-4
(1943).
69. Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912- (8th Cir. 1897); Haverhill Strand
Theatre v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671 (1918).
70. I failed to appreciate what now seems to me to be the meaning of the passage
quoted from the Briggs-Stratton opinion until after Cox and Seidman, Federalimn and
Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1950), was published. Our intimation that the
CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
in deciding what methods involving concert of action are protected by section
7. Nor does it seem to advance the point to say that "because legal conduct
may not be made illegal by concert, it does not mean that otherwise illegal
action is made legal by concert." The truism would fit the facts of the Briggs-
Stratton case only if a series of unannounced stoppages would be "unlawful"
on the part of an individual acting alone. Concert of action was an essential
part of the unfair labor practice with which the employees were charged,7 1 and
there is nothing in the Wisconsin statutes or court decisions making it any
more unlawful for an individual to stop work for a series of short, un-
announced periods than it would be for him to quit work for a longer period
in order to achieve the same end. By common law standards both would be a
breach of the servant's duty to his master, but although at least one court has
relied on the breach of provisions implied in the individual employee's contract
of hiring as ground for denying the protection of section 7,72 the servant's
duty to his master at common law does not furnish a satisfactory test for
the definition of "concerted activities." This is demonstrated most clearly
by the cases holding that a spontaneous refusal to work for the purpose of
presenting a grievance to the employer is a concerted activity even though
the employees do not leave the premises for the purpose of going on strike.7 3
The Briggs-Stratton decision illustrates the developing rule that employees
are not engaged in concerted activities when, without going on strike and quit-
ting their employment, they "continue to work and remain at their positions, ac-
cept the wages paid them, and at the same time select what part of their allotted
tasks they care to perform of their own volition, or refuse openly or secretly, to
the employer's damage, to do other work. 174 The rule has been applied to em-
ployees who refuse to work overtime,75 systematically slow down production,7
refuse to handle correspondence of a struck plant, 77 engage in unannounced
passage was obscure now seems unjustified and some of our inferences may have been
too broad. See pp. 337-339 infra. I trust that the criticisms of the opinion in this
article will not prove, upon further reflection, to be equally mistaken.
71. Wisc. STAT. § 111.06(2) (h) (1947).
72. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946).
73. NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1939) ; NLRB v. Kenna-
metal, Inc., 182 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1950); Gullet Gin Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 499 (5th
Cir. 1950), inodified, 71 Sup. Ct. 337 (1951) ; Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d
714, 717-718 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Agar Packing & Provision Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1949) ;
Globe Wireless, Ltd., 88 N.L.R.B. No. 211, 25 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1460 (1950).
74. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 496 (8th Cir. 1946).
75. NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1945) ; C. G. Conn,
Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939).
76. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 26 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1493 (1950).
77. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
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work stoppages 7s or disobey the lawful directions of their superiors.7 9 Such
decisions reflect an apparently deep-seated community sentiment. Despite
their obvious effectiveness neither the slow-down nor similar practices have
taken hold in the American labor movement, and there can be little doubt of
the general public condemnation of occupying a job and taking pay while
simultaneously refusing to perform the services required. It is at least
partly to this criterion that the Briggs-Stratton decision must be traced.
Invoking this principle the employer argued in Hoover Co.80 that sec-
tion 7 did not cover a consumer boycott organized by the store's employees
without going on strike. The NILRB rejected the argument and held that
the discharge of such employees violated section 8(a) (1).
• . . It is clear that in grafting these exceptions upon the broad
language of Section 7, the Board and courts have been particularly
careful to'limit such exceptions to those instances in which the mneans
employed involved violence or similar misconduct, or where the objec-
tives sought were inconsistent with the terms of the clearly enunciated
policy of this Act or other federal statutes. . . . absent any showing
that the neans employed were other than peaceful or that the ob-
jectives sought were [such] as have been held for reasons of
clear public policy to be improper we find, no authority to regard
the concerted activity involved herein as unprotected."'
The term "violence or similar misconduct" is hardly descriptive of slowdowns,
refusals to work overtime and the like; but one could overlook the misplaced
emphasis if the opinion had not immediately substituted "other than peaceful"
as justification for the conclusion that the Hoover boycott was a protected
activity. The unexplained transition has only the dubious virtue of freeing
the Board from the necessity of explaining why employees may be dis-
charged for slowing down production or refusing to work overtime but not
for persuading their employer's customers to patronize other establishments.
8 2
Perhaps the distinction lies in the relative effectiveness of the employees'
activities. The Briggs-Stratton opinion hints that the Court was moved
78. International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin E. R. Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
79. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1947); NLRB
v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1942). See also cases denying the protection of
section 7 to employees who have shut off the power. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46
N.L.R.B. 714 (1943); River Falls Cooperative Creamery, 90 N.L.R.B. 56, 26 LAB. REL.
REP. (Ref. Man.) 1208 (1950). Contra: Andrews Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 379 (1949).
80. 90 N.L.R:B. No. 201, 26 LAB. RF.L. IUP. (Ref. Man.) 1365 (1950).
81. 26 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) at 1367-1368. (Italics added.)
82. Two additional cases should be noted which point in a direction contrary to
Hoover Co. In Greater New York Broadcasting Corp., 48 N.L.R.B. 718 (1943), the
NLRB denied reinstatement to a chief engineer who led the company to believe that he
would perform his duties during an unfair labor practice strike by the rank and file but
then refused. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 851 (1949), extended the doc-
trine to supervisors who, without engaging in deceptive misconduct, refused to perform
the Work of strikers necessary to protect the plant. Neither case has current importance
because the Taft-Hartley amendments deny supervisors the status of employees under
the NLRA.
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by the fear that not the states but "the management also would be disabled
from any kind of self-help to cope with these coercive tactics of the
union except to submit to its undeclared demands.""3  Collective bargain-
ing can function as a mechanism for pricing labor only if there is some
bargaining power on each side. Slow-downs and similar disobedience on
the job cost the employees nothing and, if they were protected activities,
management would be helpless to resist. Hence such weapons are too
effective to permit them to be part of the employees' arsenal..
At one time the NLRB attempted to resolve the problem somewhat dif-
ferently. Instead of denying all protection to employees who engaged in such
activities, it followed the words of section 7 to the literal conclusion that they
were engaged in "cohcerted activities" and could not lawfully be discharged.
Nevertheless, since the employees were unwilling to work on terms prescribed
by their employer, the employer had the right to exclude them from the plant
until they offered to obey his instructions while they were on the job.8 '
Presumably, the employer, having converted the issue into a strike, could also
hire replacements . 8  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed
with this ruling. Either the men were engaged in concerted activities, the
court said, or they were not. If they were, the employer could not exclude
them from the plant without being guilty of interference, coercion and re-
straint; if they were not so engaged, he was free to impose any discipline."0
Such verbal difficulties should not be insuperable. An employer is privileged
to hire replacements for economic strikers even though this is a deterrent
to concerted activities.87  By a parity of reasoning he should be entitled
to exclude from the plant, and seek replacements for, employees who attempt
to hold their jobs and take wages while refusing to perform their duties.
And in *each case also, the employer's privilege to take countermeasures
should cease when the employees offer to terminate their activities. This
solution would preserve a tolerable balance of economic power between
employer and employees in case of open conflict without requiring the
NLRB and courts to read into "concerted activities" moral and economic
limitations for which they lack accepted standards. Protection would be
denied only to violence, mass picketing' and related misconduct which both
our labor laws and general criminal statutes have uniformly condemned. 8
83. 336 U.S. 245, 264 (1949).
84. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 714, 716 (1943).
85. Pinaud, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 235 (1943).
86. NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F.2d 262, 267 (6th "Cir. 1945).
87. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
88. NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7tli Cir. 1945) (mass picketing);
NLRB v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F.2d 566 (7th-Cir. 1947) (obstructing access to plant) ;
The International Nickel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 286 (1948) (obstructing access to plant);
Dearborn Glass Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 891 (1948) ; Republic Creosoting Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 267
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The difficulties in defining "concerted activities" are immeasurably in-
creased when one passes from consideration of the means of self-help to its
objectives. The passage in the Hoover Co. opinion quoted above indicates that
the NLRB is disposed to exclude concerted activities from the scope of section
7 because of their objective only where the objective is "inconsistent with the
terms of the clearly enunciated policy of this Act or other federal statutes."8
By adhering to this principle the NLRB could avoid making essentially legisla-
tive judgments and thus escape the morass in which the equity courts bogged
down. The philosophy of collective bargaining also requires avoidance of
any attempt to judge by law the social desirability or undesirability of em-
ployee objectives in the normal area of economic competition.
Nevertheless, these desiderata ought not to be pushed to a dryly logical
conclusion. The range of employee interests is constantly widening. Although
no very serious problems would result from extending section 7 to employee
activities without regard to their purpose so long as the extension affected only
the employer's treatment of such strikers, further development along these
lines, coupled with the rulings that the states cannot interfere with "con-
certed activities,""0 might seriously impair the state power to deal with social
and economic problems.
The necessity of drawing a line is illustrated by the conflict which
arises in applying state anti-trust policies to labor unions. Some unions
have endeavored to enlarge the employment opportunities open to their
members by refusing to handle products manufactured outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the union.0 ' Others seek to protect their wages and working
standards against the competition of one man businesses by driving the
independents from the market or forcing them to observe union rules.92
Still other unions, representing employees in industries in which the em-
ployees' earnings are intimately related to the prices at which the industry sells
its products or services, have sponsored combinations to control prices or limit
production.03 If employees whose wages were tied to the price at which the
products sold were to strike for an agreement with the employer establishing
(1940) (assault and battery; leaving power house dangerously unattended) ; Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co., 46 N.L.R.B. 714 (1943), modified in other respects, 147 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.
1945) (pulling power switch).
89. 26 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) at 1368.
90. See p. 334 supra.
91. E.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945);
Mayer Bros. Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 274 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1948).
92. E.g., Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942);
Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944).
93. E.g., Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E.2d 751 (Mass. 1951); De Neri v. Gene
Louis, Inc., 174 Misc. 1000, 21 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1940), affirmed, 261 App. Div. 920, 25
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1941), modified, 288 N.Y. 592, 42 N.E.2d 602 (1942); Hawaiian Tuna
Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 72 F.Supp.
562 (D. Hawaii, 1947); cf. Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947).
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minimum prices, they could argue with some plausibility that they were exercis-
ing the right to bargain collectively about wages and other conditions of em-
ployment, that a strike to back up the demand was a concerted activity pro-
tected by section 7, and that for a state to interfere by an injunction would
be inconsistent with federal law and invalid under the supremacy clause.
One answer to this line of argument may be that price policies are not
proper subjects of collective bargaining and therefore cannot be legitimate
objects of concerted action. There are cases under the anti-injunction laws
which intimate that the law may develop along these lines.94 The slogan
"management prerogative" has also been interjected into cases turning on
the interpretation of "concerted activities." In NLRB v. Reynolds Inter-
national Pen Co.," the Seventh Circuit declared that a walkout to protest
the demotion of a foreman fell outside the protection of section 7. A later
decision of the same court held that the employees were properly concerned
with the selection of an insurance company cashier whose duties affected
their earnings, 96 but one judge delivered a strong dissenting opinion arguing
that these were matters "wholly within the realm of the managerial orbit. '97
There will be strong temptation to try to draw such a line in cases in-
volving prices, production and other managerial policies -affecting the em-
ployees. The analysis is less objectionable than the common law objectives
test but it has many of the same faults. The conflict between manage-
ment and union over their respective functions is scarcely more amenable to
a hard and fast legal solution than their controversies over other issues.98
A wiser solution, more consonant with the philosophy of the NLRA,
would be to leave the definition of the respective functions of management
and union to the interplay of competitive forces but also to hold that the
NLRA does not cut down state power to enact and enforce state laws govern-
ing the terms of collective bargaining agreements where the state law expresses
a public concern for matters other than the method of resolving conflicts of
interest between employers and employees or different groups of employees.
Prior to 1935 the employer was largely free, under the conditions bf modern
industry, to dictate terms and conditions of employment not regulated by
statute. The chief purpose of the NLRA was to encourage the growth of
94. In addition to the cases cited in notes 87 and 89 sup-ra, see Bakery Sales Drivers
Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948).
95. 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947).
96. NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1949).
97. Id. at 989. Cf. Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949),
holding that activity to procure the discharge of a foreman was, under the circumstances,
the venting of personal spite and not "for the purposes of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid and protection." The NLRB reached a similar conclusion in Fontaine Con-
verting Works, Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1386 (1948).
98. Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the NLRB, 63 HARv. L.
RIv. 389 (1950).
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strong unions and spread the institution of collective bargaining, under which
negotiations between the employer and employees as a group are substituted
for the employer's dictate. The accomplishment of this purpose does not
require federal preemption of the field against all state laws limiting what
may be done by a labor union alone or by agreement between a union and an
employer. This seems beyond dispute in the case of laws having general ap-
plicability, such as anti-trust lawsf9 insurance regulations and sundry criminal
statutes; but state legislation regulating wages, hours or other terms and
conditions of employment as such may present a more debatable question in
view of the evidence that Congress preferred to have wages and hours fixed
by "free collective bargaining" rather than direct government control.100
So long as the state labor legislation does no more than fix the outside limits
of a permissible bargain, however, the interference with the institution of col-
lective bargaining is so slight that Congress cannot fairly be supposed to have
withdrawn from the states power to establish fair labor standards. Surely
a state statute limiting the hours of employment for women is not inapplicable
to interstate industries because it may interfere with a union's wish to negotiate
for a longer workweek at high overtime rates. A statute forbidding dis-
crimination against women might prevent a union from negotiating contracts
excluding women from certain kinds of employment; nevertheless it must be
held valid even as applied to interstate industries. Note well, however, that
the suggested principle permits the application of state law only when it is
directed at the actual or supposed evils flowing from the prohibited arrange-
ment. The NLRA blocks a state from attempting to deal with actual or.
supposed evils flowing from the processes of collective bargaining, including
those of resort to economic weapons, when the industry is covered by the
federal act. Thus a state law providing that a pension plan or welfare fund
should not be made the subject of a collective bargaining agreement would be
invalid as applied to interstate industries because the .failure to outlaw all plans
shows that the state is less concerned with the consequences of pension plans
and welfare funds than with the method by which such terms of employment
are arranged. 10 '
Where these principles permit the application of a state law to employ-
ment in interstate industries, section 7 should not be interpreted to protect
strikes, picketing and similar activities aimed at accomplishing a violation of
99. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 93 N.E.2d 751 (Mass. 1950) semble; Mayer Bros.
Poultry Farms v. Meltzer, 274 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1948) setble.
100. SEN. REP. 'No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 13-14; 93 CONG. REc. 3835 (1947).
101. Some cases fall close to the line. I am inclined to the view that state regulations
of the closed or union shop and limitations on the check-off deal with the institution
of collective bargaining as a method of arranging terms and conditions of employment
and therefore could not be applied to businesses affecting commerce in the absence of
section 14(b). But there is obviously room for the opposite view.
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the statute. Since workers resort to concerted action only because it increases
their power to induce an employer to conform to their demands, Congress can
scarcely have been supposed to put a higher value on concerted action than
on its objectives. There is no reason, therefore, to interpret section 7 as
securing a privilege to engage in concerted action in order to obtain objectives
that the state has properly withheld.
It is of the utmost importance, however, not to confuse this conclusion
with the common law objectives test. The unfortunate term "unlawful
objective" describes at least three kinds of purposes:
(a) A purpose to induce another (usually the employer) to commit
a crime, tort, or other breach of legal duty.1 2  Probably this
category should be broadened sufficiently to include the purpose of
inducing another to engage in conduct which is against the declared
public policy of the state but which is not prohibited by law. 1 13
(b) A purpose to induce another to engage in conduct which is law-
ful and not contrary to public policy but which the court deems of in-
sufficient benefit to the employees to justify a strike. For example,
Massachusetts long adhered to the rule that closed shop contracts
which were lawful and, when voluntarily executed, would be en-
forced by the courts, were nevertheless an unlawful objective of
concerted labor activity. 04
(c) A purpose to-bring organized economic power to bear upon the
decision of another in matters in which considerations of public
policy require that he should have freedom of choice. For example,
a state may wish to protect the community against the social and
economic consequences of the destruction of small independent en-
terprises by large combinations of capital or labor. 10 5
The proposed analysis holds that concerted activities for the first purpose
may be forbidden by a state without conflict with section 7 even in industries
affecting commerce." 0 Judicial opposition to concerted action in the second
category was not based upon the employees' goal but upon concert of action as
a method of achieving the goal. Under such a rule of decision or corresponding
statute the employees are free to pursue their aim by other methods. The teach-
ing of the passage quoted earlier from the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in the
Briggs-Stratton case appears to be that the purpose of section 7 was to im-
munize employees against the impact of this doctrine.' 0 7 It accords with
our analysis.
102. E.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ; R. H. White
Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 38 N.E.2d 685 (1942).
103. E.g., Building Service Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); cf.
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
104. See note 68 supra.
105. E.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
106. There would remain the question whether the field of interstate commerce was
preempted by section 8(b). I would give the same answer, but the issue is analytically
different and no attempt has been made to deal with it in this article. -See Cox and Seid-
man, op. cit. supra, 231-236, 241-243.
107. See p. 336 supra.
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Cases falling in the third category are the most puzzling. Under the
rule proposed a state which enacted a comprehensive law prohibiting any
form of interference of technological advance, would have power to deal
with union violations as well as others. The usual situation, however, is that
the state leaves employers free to delay technological advances in order
to prevent existing plants from becoming obsolescent too rapidly, permits
unions to bargain for such delays so long as they do not resort to strikes
or picketing, but enjoins concerted activity looking towards the accom-
plishment of such a purpose. In this situation the state policy condemns
concert of action as such, but it differs from cases in the second category
because here the condemnation may stem from a desire to avoid the con-
sequences of the employer's yielding to the union pressure. The issue
could easily go either way, but it would seem more consistent with the
philosophy of section 7 to hold that the federal right to engage in con-
certed activities prbtects strikes, boycotts and picketing whose purpose is
to achieve any objective of collective bargaining which has not been out-
lawed by the state. This may seem to make the application of section 7
depend upon state law but only in the sense that the federal guaranty goes
to a method of self-help and is not concerned with establishing a uniform
rule as to the terms permissible in a collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, an employer should not be guilty of an unfair labor practice
if he disciplines strikers for engaging in concerted conduct which the ap-
plicable state law constitutionally forbids. Such a strike would not be
concerted activity within the meaning of section 7.
II
In an article already too long it would exhaust the reader's patience to dis-
cuss at length the respective responsibilities of the National Labor Relations
Board and the courts in resolving questions concerning the meaning of "con-
certed activities." Yet the points already discussed are closely bound up with
the question whether the courts should substitute independent judgment' for
NLRB rulings, merely giving weight to administrative opinion, or should af-
firm any NLRB determination that has "'warrant in the record' and a
reasonable basis in law." 108  Perhaps it will be perhissible, therefore, to
sketch a few suggestions.
Up to the present the courts have shown no tendency to defer to the
NLRB. In the Briggs-Stratton case the Supreme Court noted that the union
had argued that the "quickie" strikes should be held protected by section
7 "because that has become the settled interpretation of the Act by the
108. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
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Board charged with its administration."'' 9  The Court concluded that that
was not the NLRB interpretation but went on to say:
However, in no event could the Board adopt such a binding practice
as to the scope of § 7 in the light of the construction, with which we
agree, given to § 7 by the Courts of Appeals, authorized to review
Board orders.11"
The Hearst case has been cited in none of the opinions in which the Board's
application of section 7 has been reviewed by the courts of appeals. Under
the precedents, therefore, the interpretation of "concerted activities" will be
a matter for independent judicial determination.
With respect to many issues this conclusion is probably inevitable. Even
though the cases on the scope of judicial review leave the court a broad range
of discretion the factors influencing its choice can be identified. Professor
Davis groups them under four heads: (a) the comparative qualifications of
the court and administrative agency, (b) manifestations of an intent to dele-
gate administrative power, (c) the generality or specificity of the issue, and
(d) unarticulated preferences.-" In deciding many of the issues concerning
the meaning of "concerted activities" the relevant factors point towards inde-
pendent judicial determination. The scope given to the phrase is likely to mark
boundaries of state power, hence its interpretation involves the Court's tradi-
tional function of mediating between state and nation. This is particularly
true, for example, of such questions as whether the states may enact either
general or special laws affecting the terms that may be included in collective
bargaining a'reements. It is equally true of issues concerning the impact of
section 7 on the common law objectives test. Even in the exclusive realm of
the federal government the basic questions are as familiar to courts as to the
Board. Thus, deciding what effect to give a related federal statute involves the
kind of appraisal of the thrust and interplay of legislation that forms the bulk
of present day adjudication in the federal appellate courts. There is also scant
evidence that Congress desired to leave this sort of question to the NLRB even
though it is vested with broad discretion in applying the basic statute. The
questions obviously have a generality reaching far beyond the confines of a
particular controversy. These, factors make it exceedingly unlikely that
the Court will invoke the rule of Gray v. Powell"2 in dealing with the major
questions in this area, most of which are likely to come up from state
tribunals without a litigated NLRB decision on the controversy." 3
109. 336 U.S. 245, 255 (1949).
110. Id. at 257.
111. Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COL. L. REV.
560 (1950).
112. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
113. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944), the Court
noted that broad questions of statutory interpretation were for the courts to resolve
"especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings."
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Nevertheless, there are two kinds of question upon which the courts, in my
opinion, should defer to an NLRB decision. One kind involves applications of
the general principle that conduct inconsistent with the recognized policies of
the NLRA is not protected by section 7.114 Once the principle is established
that section 7 does not protect a strike the purpose of which is to interfere with
collective bargaining by the majority representative, the bulk of the judicial
task is done and the NLRB should decide what will be the effects of any parti-
cular strike under all the surrounding circumstances. This kind of question is
one which those who are daily immersed in the problems of labor relations are
most competent to resolve"115 and the judgment, when made, should have little
importance for later cases. The issue is very similar, moreover, to questions
which Congress committed to the Board as part of the day-to-day administra-
tion of the Act.
The second kind of question on which a measure of administrative finality
seems appropriate involves drawing the line between permissible strikes and
boycotts and improper methods of pursuing permissible objectives. The
conduct of strikers ranges from name-calling to sabotage. A decision upon
whether to grant or deny section 7 in this kind of case depends partly upon
the seriousness of the wrong, in its context, and partly upon one's estimate
of the probability that withdrawing the protection of section 7 would deter
repetition. The Board ought to be better equipped to answer these questions
than a court; and since no two cases will be quite alike, there is no occasion
to worry about the precedent value of a decision.
There is a good deal to be said for treating in like fashion questions con-
cerning the protection of employees wh6 engage in "quickies," slow-downs
and similar forms of peaceful economic pressure. Whether to grant them
protection, and how much protection to grant, depends upon a nice appraisal
of their place in industrial relations. Quite apart from the lack of forth-
rightness in the opinion, the Hoover case"16 resulted, in my personal opinion,
in a shocking decision. Nevertheless, that which offends the moral sensi-
bilities of an academician may have a different quality when judged by the
standards of the industrial world. By virtue of its experience the Board should
be better versed in that than any other body.. Despite these considerations it
seems probable that the courts will find it necessary to substitute independent
judgment on questions of this character. They will often come up from a state
court, as in the Briggs-Stratton litigation, and therefore will require judicial
determination without a litigated decision from the NLRB. Furthermore, un-
114. See p. 328 supra.
115. Cf. NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885, 887-888 (2d Cir: 1943).
116. 90 N.L.R.B. No. 201, LAB. REL. RP. (Ref. Man.) 1365 (1950). See p. 338
suprra.
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like the cases discussed in the preceding paragraph, the rulings not only will
have general application but will furnish precedents for related issues.
Where so many of the questions are inappropriate for administrative
finality, it is likely that the courts will substitute their judgment for that of the
NLRB in all cases turning on the interpretation of section 7. Perhaps such a
consequence is preferable to refinements giving the NLRB the last word on
some questions and the courts the power to make the final judgment on
others. Nevertheless it is to be hoped that the courts will give great weight
to administrative opinions on those questions within the special experience
and competence of the NLRB.
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DOCUMENTS
With this issue The Indiana Law Journal institutes a new department, a
Documents section. The failure of current legal periodicals to devote space to
documentary materials may well mean that papers of genuine legal and his-
torical value never become available even tb the scholar, certainly not to the
general reader. The student who turns up in his researches primary source
material must wait upon the day when he may have an opportunity to publish
a treatise or article upon which that material bears. The section here in-
augurated is designed to fill the gap, to provide an immediate outlet for
these items of interest.
No rigid standard will be established to determine what documents will
be selected for publication; variety seems desirable. Any item not generally
available elsewhere and significant in that it treats an important legal or
governmental problem, historic or modern, or throws light upon the life or-
thought of an important man will meet the test.
Introductory comments and annotations will supply data concerning prov-
inance, will place the document in its setting, and will assess its significance.
